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The Perceived and the Named*
Christian Metz
The viewer of an image feels the need to "recognize"
(identify) the objects which are represented therein.
When the image is figurative, as is the case in photography, paintiog, and film, it meets this need itself by
offering objects to recognize. However, it can happen,
even with strongly representative images, that the demand of the consumer remains more or less unsatisfied.
For instance, the westerner who watches an ethnographic
film often remains perplexed by the objects that he sees
in it but cannot name or classify (e.g., cooking utensils,
hunting or fishing equipment). To name, to classify: our
problem starts here, with the problem of cultural
taxonomies, encompassing both the taxonomy of cultural
objects and the cultural taxonomy of natural objects,
such as zoological or biological classification, which varies from one society to another. Phenomenology has
clearly shown us that we live in a world of objects, that our
immediate perception is a perception of objects, and that
this arrangement is neither superficial nor transitory (so
much so, I will add, that it is deeply reassuring, and that
is doubtless one of the roots of its existence). So why not
link this striking character of our lived world consciousness with the even more deeply embedded force of cultural classification and sociolinguistics?
The case of nonfigurative images (modern painting,
avant-garde films), only confirms the initial impressions
that emerge from this study. Notably, the spectator very
often has the tendency to forceably reintroduce to the
image, by the way he looks at it, objects which the au.thor
wanted to leave out. The vague forms, curves, blurs, or
shadings become clouds or dancing waters; the rectilinear drawings become railroad tracks. There are many
fewer nonfigurative images received than are sent. And
even at the sending end, the tendency toward representation is sometimes stronger than is believed by those who
consciously would like to escape it. The free contours
that we have in mind are often involuntary variations on
objects of recognizable form. There are fewer nonfigurative images than there are images that would like
to be so.
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s,emiology. He teaches at L'Ecole Pratique des Hautes
Etudes in Paris.
Steven Feld teaches visual and sound communication at
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Translated by
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Codes of Iconic Nomination
Work in philosophy, and the psychology of perception
and observation, taught us long ago that the identification of tangible objects was closely mixed with their linguistic nomination. The semantic organization of natural
languages, within certain sectors of the lexicon, overlaps
with the variable margins of shifting configurations and
demarcations of perception. The visible world and language are thus not without multiple and deep structural
interactions, and these have not yet been studied in the
detailed technical terms of intercodal relations. It is
exactly to such a study that I would Iike to address myself.
But one thing already seems certain to me: even if the
connection between language and the viewed can hardly
be conceived of as a complete "copy"-either one
served by the other-certainly one function of language
is to name the units that vision demarcates, and to help
demarcate them. And one function of vision is to inspire
the semantic configurations of language, and also to be
inspired by them.
Recently, from the semiological perspective, these
problems, which are exceedingly old in themselves, have
been approached from two sides-on the linguistic front
by A. J. Greimas (1968) and on the iconic front by Umberto Eco (1968, 1970). I have myself devoted some brief
analytical sketches to them, where the main interest was
the articulation of the two sides (Metz 1971, 1973). That is
really the heart of the matter. I have proposed the term
"codes of iconic nomination" for the systems of correspondence which explain that within figurative imagery,
even schematics, one can instantly recognize and name
objects. These codes are thus the constituent mechanisms of "analogy" and "iconicity," or the impression of
resemblance and reality that give us representative images. They contribute to the creation of fiction, diegesis,t
and the pseudo-real. It is now time-and the general
state of previous research does not deprive the undertaking of all risk-to try one's skill at a more detailed and
systematic description of these bridging devices. Between image and language, they facilitate the objective
production of a whole network so interiorized by the culture that, on the one hand, the phenomenologists were
able to describe them as spontaneous (which they are in
effect) and, on the other, as deeply tied in the West to the
Aristotelian tradition (quantitatively dominant even today)
of diegetic or mimetic art, in short, representative art.
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Which Part Image, Which Part Language?
It is first necessary to delim it the object of this research
and establ ish boundaries on both its sides. The codes of
iconic nomination do not relate the whole of language to
the whole of imagery. The ir study should not aspire to
exhaust the vast question of the links between the perceptual and the linguistic but on the contrary should
concentrate on one of its levels in order to attempt to
better il luminate it.

Lexicon
On the side of language we will limit ourselves to the
lexicon. It hardly seems possible, for the moment, to serious ly establish even sli ghtly precise correlations between the perception of objects in a soc iety and the
phonological and grammatical structures of the correspond ing language. This difficulty, which perhaps will not
be eternal , is connected to another one which is more
general and well known to linguists: in. spite of some
interesting attempts1 no one has succeeded thus far in
linking, in a convincing fashion, phonological or syntactic
systems with social structures. It is across these two systems that language preserves for the moment its great
relative autonomy in comparison with other institutions
where the very existence of linguistics is founded , inasmuch as the discipline is distinct from sociology (but
belongs to the social sciences since language is an institution). Of all the internal sectors of language it is, on
the contrary, the lexicon which brings the most important
and most immediately exploitable materials to those who
wish to found a sociolinguistics. 2 It is clear that words are
linked to culture (and , among other things, to the faculty
of sight), following a shorter and more direct circuit than
do phonemes or rules of grammar. Moreover, the lexicon
is the only part of language wh ich immediately exercises
the function of nomination, that is to say, which enumerates the objects of the world and gives them a name. The
referential dimension, which characterizes all of language, appears in a direct fashion only within the lexicon.
The dissymmetry of the situation is certainly reflected
in the concepts of a semanticist like A. J. Greimas (1966).
Semes, as such, constitute the "semiological level," that
is, that level at which language articulates about the
"natural world ." These are distinguished from classemes,
whose entirety forms the "semantic level ," that is, the level
of autonomy of the linguistic orgaoization. Thus we see
the differences between semanticisms like "in an oblong
shape ," "made of leather," or "belonging to the feline
species," which are semes or "nuclear" to the degree
they are as diverse and specific .as the perceive~ objects of a culture which they desrgnate and constrtute at
the same time. Units of meaning like human/nonhuman,
material object/abstract notion, or animate/inanimate
are classemes, or "contextual semes ," which have a
more general significance within the lexicon and which
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intervene in the naming of numerous tangible objects.
Furthermore, at a different level, they submit also to a
second classification (whose links are in fact larger than
the first operated by the nominations themselves), which
extends beyond the lexicon to grammar, where they
often correspond to some formal markers. Thus we have
the case of human/nonhuman, the difference between
qui/quai in French , and who/which in English. Just as
the classemes within a language are common to the
grammar and the lexicon, the nuclear semes (which I
will henceforth simply call semes, since this study is
limited to them) are suited only to the lexicon . I will not
discuss all the lexical semes but only those which intervene in the lexicon of visual objects.

To Recognize the Object
In the domain of the image, the codes of iconic nomination no longer involve the whole ensemble of semiological material. We no longer need to review every sense
and all senses of the representative image. To recognize
the object is not to understand the image, even if that is
the beginning of it. It is only a question of a level of
meaning, that which is called the literal ( = denotation or
representation) , and not the entirety. The apprehension of
relationsh ips between objects, or at least of their more
factual relations, still participates in the literal sense, but
is taken over by other codes. Notably this involves montage in the most general sense of the word, encompassing the internal composition of the still unique image. To
understand that one object, in a narrative, appeared only
a few minutes after another, or that they are constantly
copresent, or that one is to the left of the other, or farther
back, is already something more than visually identifying
each of these objects. The "recognition" should therefore
be understood as an operation which articulates certain
sectors of linguistic activity and not directly the whole of
language over the whole of perception.

From the Word to the Sememe
If one poses the problem in this way, it becomes essential
to know to what sort of linguistic unit the optically identifiable object exactly corresponds, since language includes units that are very diverse in figure and status.
Common-sense response leaves no doubt-it is the
word. The act of nomination, considered in its concrete
and directly observable form, corresponds most often to
a word, that which comes to mind when our eye recognizes an object: "It's a dog," "it's a lamp."
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Yet the pertinence of a word does not resist analysis.
The word is a two-sided unit, with its signified and its
phonic signifier. Accordingly, that which can "correspond" to an iconic element will necessarily be a unit of
the linguistic signified and therefore only a one-sided
unit. The naming of visible objects is a case, among
others, of transcoding. In all transcoding (translation, for
example) the only direct transit is that which passes between the two respective signifieds. (I will return to this
point, which is in fact more complex). Nomination is more
than transcoding, though it is that also. It is clear that no
direct correspondence between the signifier of an image
representing a house and the signifier of the word house
(or maison or casa) is conceivable. This is a consequence of the "arbitrariness" of linguistic signs. The two
materials are absolutely heterogeneous; one is outlines,
colors, shades, and so on, the other an emission of the
human voice . The optical aspects of a house bear no
relation to the fact that the French word maison has four
phonemes rather than three or five, and exactly those
four. These are the signifieds which articulate one
another, the recognized object and the meaning of
the word.
The lexeme (lexical morpheme) is another sort of linguistic unit, smaller than a word, that for the same reasons no longer suits our purposes. It is still a two-sided
unit which includes phonetic elements. So, how shall we
distinguish the signified of the word from the signified of
the lexeme? At the level of the word or even the lexeme
the signified can include several units which are quite
distinct on the optical plane. For example, the French
word chevre means both the animal called "goat" and the
tool called "sawhorse." That is the problem of multiple
meanings.
In sum, the visual correspondence should have become established with a linguistic unit that is a pure
signified, which is smaller than the signified of the
lexeme--or the signified of one sense of a lexeme, or of
the unique sense of a lexeme with one meaning. But the
linguistic unit we are studying can in certain cases coincide with a longer segment than a lexeme or even a word
on the condition that one always pictures a single mean~
ing for the signified of .the segment. The object which one
names betterave ("beetroot" in English) is recognizable
in an image, and corresponds in French to two lexemes
(bette and rave) grouped here in a single word. The object which one names pomme de terre ("potato" in English) corresponds to three French lexemes, which also
happen to be three words. Nevertheless, as perceptual
elements they are obviously at the same level as the
French carotte (English "carrot"), where the nomination
uses a single lexeme that coincides with a word. This is
not an accident since within the linguistic order itself it is
a question in this case of a sequence of several lexemes
(eventually of several words) being lexically congealed
and turned into a single lexeme. In the terms of Andre
Martinet (1967) these are not syntagmes (free syntactic

combinations) but synthemes, combinations which have
been formed by the language once and forever and
which enter the lexicon with the same status as undecomposable segments. If a potato (pomme de terre) is
red in color (rouge) , one speaks of a pomme de terre
rouge and not of a pomme rouge de terre. As Martinet
proposes the term "theme" for jointly designating synthemes and proper lexemes, we can ask that the visually
identifiable object correspond at the level of nomination
to one meaning of theme, which is to say exactly what
Greimas3 calls a sememe.

Cultural Taxonomy of Objects
Each sememe (a specific unit at the level of the signified)
denotes a class of occurrences, not a single occurrence.
There exist thousands of "trains" even within the single
sense of "railroad cars," and these differ greatly from each
other in color, height, number of cars, and so on. But the
cultural taxonomy which is contained in the language has
determined to hold these variations to be irrelevant and to
consider them the same object (of a single class of objects). It has also determined that other variations are
pertinent and sufficient "to change" the object, as, for
example, those which separate train and micheline.+ It is
the same apportionment, so variable among different
societies, of pertinent and irrelevant traits-in sum the
same "arbitrary" principle of the enumeration of
objects-which presides over spontaneous classifications that operate the perception of corresponding objects within the same culture. The sight itself is slightly
obscured to the extent that the image does not determine
whether it is a train or a micheline. Once it is demarcated
the viewer of the image has the feeling of "recognizing '
the object." It is notable, then, that one false perception of
the color of this micheline (if it is one) or of its exact
length or of the metal of which it is made does not constitute a comparable obstacle.
~he traits that do not partic ipate in this decoupage of
obJe?!s are culturally experienced as types of secondary
qual1t1es, determinations superimposed as something
extra and not indispensable to the immediate intellection
-adjectival qualities rather than substantive ones. It is
most often true that linguistic expression of these visual
p~rticu.larities is conveyed by adjectives (a long
m_tcheltne) or by certain determinants which are larger in
s1ze but syntactically interchangeable with adjectives,
a~, for ~xample , the subordinate relative phrase "a
mtche~tne that goes very quickly." To the contrary, perti~ent v1su~l qualiti.es, those which, by their grouping in
packets, determme the list of objects to recognize, express themselves in language through nouns. As we have
known for a long time, the nomination of objectsbecause there are also those of actions, to which I will
return-proceeds by nouns. Traditional grammar says
that nouns correspond to objects, adjectives to qualities
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and verbs to actions. Simply, "objects" are only sets of
qualities considered as definers, and what we call qualities covers only those qualities whose proper meaning
does not enter into the definition of the objects.
Optically identifiable objects are, then, classes of occurrences, like the sememes which they name. That is
why Greimas proposes naming them "visual fig ures" (the
pertinent units) and then further distinguishes "visual
signs," which will be singular occurrences, such as one
drawing of a house or one photograph of a tree.4 But
within linguistic tradition the term "sign" is too strongly
evocative of the pertinent unit for it to have any chance of
being made to designate the contrary. It seems preferable to me not to adopt a special term and to speak simply
of "recognizable visual objects" as opposed to "visual
occurrences."

About "Nomination"
One sees that the fundamental phenomenon of nomination is itself quite poorly named . In the word "nomination"
the sememe nom corresponds to the English "name" and
not to the English "noun." But it nevertheless designates a
linguistic unit which is on the order of a word. Now it is
only at the surface level that nomination proceeds by
words. The real correspondences between the visible
world and language are established at the level of pertinent traits, which are deeper and more invisible units.
The word (nom) which designates the optical object only
constitutes the emergent part of the system, a consequence that is manifest by the play of the pertinent traits
and their internal organization. When an iconic item carries all the definitive traits required for us to recognize, for
example, a bulb (electric light bulb), and when one has
access to the corresponding sememe (ampoule =electrical accessory), this last access is carried to the lexeme
where it contributes to an articulation of the signified
(here "electric light bulb" in all its sen~es, but ~lsewhere
"bulb" forms a word by itself). And th1s word, 1n turn ,
functions as a two-sided entity, which also has its own
signifier and can therefore express itself. The viewer of
the image explains to himself, "That's a light bulb." In the
complete process of nomination, then , the word does
play a role, but only at the endpoint.
The term "nomination" is not peculiar to linguistics or to
modern semiology. It has come a long way, historically in
languages (nominative case) .. an? ~lso fr~m a whole
philosophical tradition. It cames 1n .Itself . m. a condensed
state, a certain concept of the relat1onsh1p oetwe~~ language and the world, a c~ncept that has b~en_ cnt1qued
since Saussure as what G1lbert Ryle terms na1ve
realism." For him there was a sort of list of objects,
preexisting their 'naming, and the words came to "name"
(nominate) these objects after the fact, one by one. As
long as we limit ourselves to the surface level (that of the
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word or even the lexeme) we are inevitably drawn toward
faith in this view. The word, the lexeme (and on the other
side of the problem, the visual object, once recognized)
is not the end product, because the decoupage of the
world into objects (and of language into sememes) is a
complex process of cultural production. At the heart of
this process the central role has been broken down into
pertinent traits: traits of visual identification on one side
(Eco) and linguistic semes on the other (Greimas).

Determination by Social Practice
This double decoupage did not exist before social activity and the features of each culture. It is determined by
them, and at the same time it implements them. We know
that the Eskimo employ some ten different lexemes (and
thus different sememes) for designating snow, according
to whether it is crumbly, hardened, slippery, piled up and
so forth (Schaff 1965). Each of these units consists of an
undecomposable lexeme, while the languages of Western Europe are obligated, in order to designate the corresponding "objects," to form a nominal syntagme, which
each time combines the appropriate adjective (e.g.,
powdery), with a noun that is invariably "snow" (neige,
Schnee, nieve ). Thus our culture sees a single object with
variable types, where the Eskimo see ten different objects. A perceptible trait like "crumbly" or "hardened"
(with its corresponding seme), while pertinent to the Eskimo, is considered irrelevant in our languages, at least
when the question is the "nomination" of snow.
This variation in lexical organization is obvious in relation to a difference in the perception of snow, which is
more subtle and more finely distinguished among the
Eskimo. Each society lexicalizes the distinctions which it
perceives the most clearly, and in return, perceives with
particular clarity the distinctions which it lexicalizes. It
would be a fruitless quarrel that would initially seek to
know whether it is language that informs perception or
perception which informs language. In fact, the one and
the other have been shaped by society. 5 In our cultures,
the modes of work and production are such that snow
plays a minor role, and careful attention to its different
states would be without immediate utility. The Eskimo,
who hunt and fish in largely snow-covered landscapes,
and whose very survival depends on that, are obliged to
know the diversities of the snow well: those which permit
the hunt, those which represent a danger of sinking, those
which announce a blizzard, and so on. A society
lexicalizes and perceives the distinctions for which it has
the greatest need.
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The Pertinent Traits of Perceptual Identification
Vision does not identify an object as a result of the totality
of its perceptible appearance, or as a result of the surface
of the paper, in the case of the same object being in the
state of " representation" in a drawing or photograph,
which is to say, the object relayed by codes of analogy.
Thus it can be explained that schematic representations
of objects in which the majority of the perceptible features have been deliberately suppressed are also recognizable (and sometimes more so) than many more faithful
representations which are far more complete at the level
of material expression (more exhaustive in respect to details of form, color, etc.): representations in which the
degree of schematization is smaller and the degree of
iconicity greater (Moles 1968). It is noteworthy that highly
schematized images are very identifiable (the whole of
the art of caricature lies therein). Visual recognition is
based on certain perceptible traits of the object and its
image (to the exclusion of others), only those which
keep-and for the moment, materially isolate-the
schema and the caricature . If they are sometimes more
implied than detailed figurations, it is because they avoid
the risk of drowning these traits in the midst of others,
thus slowing the marking of guidelines. On the contrary,
the image which shows great detail sometimes becomes
the image-jumble (!'image fouillee devient parfois !'image fouillis).

The Schematic Diagram
The traits which retain the schema-Drat least the figurative schema, because there are also some others (e.g.,
diagrams)-correspond exactly to pertinent traits of the
code of recognition so well described by Umberto Eco,
who has cited diverse examples of them .6 Others could
be borrowed from caricature: arms raised above the
head, a tall figure , and it is enough for us to recognize de
Gaulle; bushy eyebrows, a round face, and it's President
Pompidou. In certain comic drawings two protuberances
on one side and two on the other are sufficient to represent the breasts and buttocks, so that we interpret it as
"woman." (Needless to say, such a choice of pertinent
traits owes itself to an ideology at the same time misogynous and maternalistic, so characteristic of the world
in which we live.) The codes are the formal machines, but
it is precisely as such that they have historical and social
content; in this example, as in others, the opposition of
form and content leads to an impasse.
So, schematisme largely overlaps schematisation . The
latter is a socially specific activity which consists of producing materialized diagrams (schemas, in the precise
sense). The former, on the contrary, is a mental , perceptual , and sociolinguistic principle of wide general bearing, which makes possible the comprehension of
schemas as well as of detailed images with a high degree of iconicity and of spectacles from real life. Even

outside all schematization, this is because only certain
sensible traits matter in identification ; visual occurrences
which differ in other traits can be perceived as multiple
examples of the same object, and not as distinct objects.
If several drawings have in common definite traits of the
visual object "key" (e.g. , a head and a shank, a certain
type of serration), they can otherwise, and without disadvantage to the sociotaxonomic permanence of the item
"key," differ very widely in size, color, diameter of the
head, depth of indentations, and so on.
In ordinary perception, or in that of strongly figurative
images, it is the social subject, the spectator, who fabricates the schema by mental subtraction of nonpertinent
traits. In the case of schematisation, it is a specialist (designer or draftsman), a "transmitter," who performs the
same subtraction in advance and materializes it. The difference is that the process of abstraction and
classification-the "subtraction "-intervenes, in one
case at the level of reception and in the other at the level
of construction. In the former it is absent in the stimulus
but reintroduced in the perceptual act; in the latter it is
integrated into the artificially constructed stimulus. 7

Perceptual Exclusions and Inclusions
It is again the schematisme, and in a more general way
the very existence of pertinent traits and occurrences,
wh ich is responsible for a rather striking structural particularity, common to both perceptual decoupage and
lexical decoupage. Two "objects" can be contained in
one another while otherwise continuing to stand for an
autonomous and distinct item , so much so that one no
longer knows whether or not they are of the same rank. In
terms of set theory one could say that it is a matter of two
classes which simultaneously maintain relations of exclusion and inclusion. Thus , for example, the sememes
and the visual objects automobile and wheel: the wheel
is a part of the automobile and can be mentioned in the
entry "automobile" in a dictionary of iconic nomination,
but the wheel is also an entirely separate unit of the same
"rank" as the automobile: our dictionary would contajn
both entries, apart from each other and on an equal level.
This apparent peculiarity, which establishes itself in a
general and permanent fashion , is the result of the fundamentally classificatory and "arbitrary" nature of nomination. When the object to which one makes reference is
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the automobile (the automobile seen or spoken of), the
wheel intervenes only as a trait for recognition, on the
level of the steering wheel, for example. But the object to
which one refers in other circumstances can be the wheel
itself (for instance, in the case of a flat tire and its repair):
it then is the thing which functions as a recognized object, or that to be recognized, and requires in its turn
those traits of recognition (e.g., circular exterior form,
marked by a "center" and radial structure).
In sum, a single material element can operate at two
distinct levels of coding: as seme and as sememe, as
"identificans" and as "identificatum" (or "i dentificandum") . Objects which must be recognized constantly
serve in the recognition of other objects. According to the
multiple and diverse exigencies of practice, perception
and the lexicon reserve the right to regroup their basic
traits in other ways, into "packets" which vary in content
and size. Each packet, whi ch barely seems to be stable,
is frequently an object. Objects are always equal as objects , even if one is susceptible to being "lost" among the
traits of another on occasion-and only on occasionwhen the second remains an object and the first, ceasing
for a moment to be, contents itself to participate in the
decoupage of the second . There never exist any objects,
properly speaking, which might be included within
others: what one finds are elements (semantic and perceptual) which the code brings into play at one time as
objects and at others as parts of objects. In any case ,
this same code sovereignly arranges the list of objects,
not only those items on it which are occasionally
eclipsed .

Within the code of visual recognition , the signifier is
never the marked or suspected object, but the set of material responsible for its being marked or suspected:
forms, contours, outlines, shadings. This is the visual
substance itself, the material of expression in the sense of
Hjelmslev.
If one considers the correspondences between language and vision a result of a social process of intellectual production which exists in an active fashion
precisely to establish them, the transit by the signifieds
represents the final, directly observable level, the final
product of this set process. Thanks to pertinent traits of
the iconic signifier, the subject identifies the object; it
establishes the visual signified. From there, it passes to
the corresponding sememe in its native language, the
linguistic signified. This is the precise moment of nomination, of clearing the intercodal bridge. By the disposition
of the sememe, the word or the lexeme which is attached
to this sememe can be pronounced, producing the
(phonic) signifier of the linguistic code. The loop is
thus looped .
The intercodal bridge can also be crossed in another
sense, from the phonic signifier to the perceptual marking of the corresponding object and then to optical traits;
or, in the absence of all real or iconic· "stimuli," to the
mental evocation of the object; that is, again, of its pertinent optical traits. These two operations are so very
common in daily life that one does not consciously think
of them. Nevertheless, without them one would not be
able to understand the following situations: if I say to a
friend, "Pass me the pencil sharpener which is somewhere on the table," he finds it and gives it to me. Or, if
someone tells me, "My sister is wearing sunglasses," I am
capable of imagining a glasses-like object, even if my
conversational partner's sister is absent and I know nothing whatever about the exact model of the glasses she is
wearing .
When the perceptual signifier (trait~ of recognition)
journies to the linguistic signifier (phonic emission, itself
either real or mental), this is nomination. When it goes
from the linguistic signifier to the visual signifier, as in the
examples given above, one is dealing with visualization,
which is the inverse and inseparable correlate of nomination (that is why this last term, in a slightly larger sense,
can conveniently designate the entire phenomenon independently of its orientation in each case). The point
common to the two orientations is that the passage from
the linguistic to the perceptual, or vice versa, lies at the
level of the two respective signifieds, the sememe and
the object.

Language Perception: Their Double Relation,
lntercodal and Metacodal
The preceding reflections show that the correspondence
between vision and language establishes itself at two
different levels: one among the sememes and optically
identifiable objects, the other among the semes and pertinent traits of visual recognition. The full significance of
this duality merits a slightly more thorough examination.

Transit by Signifieds
Insofar as the sememes correspond to optical objects (or
vice versa), the intercodal transit-the reciprocal articulation of the linguistic code and the perceptual codeproceeds through the two signifieds. In language, the
sememe is a specific unit at the level of a signified. In
perceptual activity, the "object" is equally a signified: an
already found signified once the object has been recognized, and a sought-after signified when the object is felt
to be identifiable as such but has not yet been identified.
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visual signifier
(forms, contours, etc.)
with pertinent traits

perceptual
code
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visual signified

recognizable object
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I
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Representation as Metalanguage
In many cases, and notably in those which occupy us
here, this level of relationships is neither the only nor
necessarily the most important one. Certain intercodal
relations are really more than transcodage. The relationship between language and perception is very different
than that between two languages (=translation), because
in this case the two codes no longer have an identical
semiological status and no longer occupy the same
place within the general process of socialization.

phonic emission
of themes

linguistic
code

I

observable intercodal transit

I
As long as one considers it from this vantage point,
which is not the deepest but which has its own reality, the
connection between the visual lexicon and visual perception remains on the level of ordinary transcodage. As a
defining trait of the latter, I propose retaining the
achievement of the transit by the signifieds. Transcoding
is a highly ordinary sociosemiological operation, whose
most typical form is translation; that is, a subcase of
transcod)ng where the two codes are two l~nguages.
The transit by the signifieds is neither an empirical
peculiarity nor an exceptional act. On the contrary, it rests
on a permanent and fundamental given: if the varying
codes in use distinguish among themelves-if there are
several, obviously-it is through the material and the
internal organization of their signifier (visual codes, auditory codes, etc.), or even by its organization alone when
the material is identical (e.g., the plurality of languages),
or, in any case, by the organization of their signifieds
(Hjelmslev's "form of the contents") since it is the direct or
indirects correlate of the organization of the signifier. But
it is not through the material of the signified ("material
content"), which is common to all codes and which is
always the "sense," the semantic fabric. The sense, also,
constitutes the universal intercodal footbridge. One can
switch from one code to another when two units of form of
the signified, belonging respectively to each of the two
codes (which are never, in fact, superimposable),
nevertheless occupy an adjacent position in the material
of the signified (or, as one says these days, "have very
nearly the same sense"). This happens when the translator takes a word from the source language and looks for
an equivalent word in the target language. In sum, there
definitely exists a level of relationships between codes
which always justifies saying that the passage is accomplished across the signifieds.

linguistic signifier

1

linguistic signified
~

sememe

designating
the object

Compared with all nonlinguistic codes, and with itself
when necessary, language is in the position of a
metalanguage: a universal, nonscientific metalanguage,
a "major equivalent" exchangeable with all other codes,
as is money against all other goods. There are also scientific metalanguages (formalized languages, mathematical notation, chemical notation), but it is still language
which is used to introduce them, to preliminarily explicate
them, and to define their field of validity. And within other
domains, language itself, subject to a specific task which
tranforms it in terminology-that is to say, in theorydirectly supplies the scientific metalanguage outside all
specialized notation, or in simply taking one of them as
an intermittent auxiliary title. This metalanguage consists
then of a body of linguistic statements of fact; it can pass
for the language of science itself. Thus the metal inguistic
inclination of language, universal at the nonscientific
level, is strongly reaffirmed at the scientific level. The two
things go together, and the current social classifications
are those of science. This is the problem of pensee sauvage, "the savage mind," so well posed by Levi-Strauss
(1962): all societies are societies of "savages," all people
are indigenes of some culture .
If language is the principal metalanguage, this is obviously so because no other code is situated so tightly in
daily social communications as a certain (abstract, explicit) form of thought. This is not the only operation but is
by nature the most apparent among the operations of
metalanguage. Every semiologist has noted that language, through its relationship with other codes, occupies a nonsymmetrical and privileged position 9 in that
it affects the quantitative extension of the material of the
signified (the total field of "things that one can say").
Language can say, even if sometimes only with approximation, what all the other codes can say, while the inverse is not true. (There exists, for example, no degree of
approximation, if it were imaginable, from which one
could allow that a reed pipe tune or a set of colors is
capable of "saying" even so simple a phrase as "The
train arrived at Lyon three quarters of an hour late.") Each
code "occupies" one part, and only one part, of the total
semantic material, which is to say, of the ensemble of
socially possible assertions, while language occupies
them all . Between language and the nonlinguistic codes,
the proportion of "translatability" equalizes itself rather
badly, leaning largely to one side. The advantage of this
semantic extension has a great deal to do with the social
status of language as universal commentator.
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signified of
object-code

signifier of
object-code

signified of metacode

One of the most notable consequences of this situation
in everyday life (the flow of perception, deciphering the
numerous images which offer themselves to view in
modern cities, spontaneous conversations about them
etc.) is that language does much more than transcode'
vision. Translation is another signifier of the same rank
(the "verbalizer," as it is sometimes called by aud iovisual
specialists). Language accompanies vision in permanence; it is the continuous gloss of it, it explains it,
clarifies it, to the extent to which it accomplishes it,
whether spoken aloud or by simple mnemonic evocation
of the phonic signifier. To speak of the image is in reality
to speak the image; not essentially a transcodage but a
comprehension, a resocialization where the transcodage
is only the occasion, the necessary occasion. Nomination
completes the perception as much as it translates it; an
insufficiently verbalizable perception is not fully a perception in the social sense of the word.
If I mentally dis pose of a sememe (he Iicopter, for
example) and then I am unable to draw the corresponding object on a piece of paper, it is not a matter of accidental clumsiness; I am someone who "does not know
how to draw," and no one suspects that I do not know what
a helicopter is. But if the helicopter is drawn on another
piece of paper and I am not able to name it-or, in any
case, to find the sememe, lacking the phonic signifier, as
when one has the word "on the tip of the tongue"-the
situation, turned around 180 degrees, becomes much
more serious. I have not understood the drawing, I actually do not know what it is, I am incapable of making it
exist (at least at the level of representation I am discussing in this study). Language is not only another code; it is
the metacode.

To Transcode/Metacode: Relations between the Two
Operations
It is necessary then to distinguish the metacodal relationship (relationship of the metacode to its object-code)
from the intercodal relationship, which unites two codes
on the same level, when each can function on occasion
as "interpreter" of the other, but the situation can always
be reversed. In the metacodal relationship the transit by
the signified (where the equality of the status of the two
codes becomes explicit) is not the main point. We know,
following Hjelmslev (1953:Chapter 22), that the signified
of the metacode articulates itself across the total
signifier/signified of the object-code. There it is another
sort of transit, a dissymmetrical type, which engages, in
the case of more than two signifieds, one signifier and
one only (that of the object-code). As for ·the signifier of
the metacode, it constitutes, in this "unhooked" structure
that is so well known today, the part which "exceeds," that
which speaks the object-code in its entirety. Thus, in an
oral statement, the phonic emissions of the English languagd help me to describe the signifiers and the
signifieds of the iconic code.

signifier of metacode

I

The simple intercodal relationship can be represented in
the following manner:

I

code X signifier

code X signified
code Y signified

code Y signifier

I

Only the signifieds ensure the contact between the two
codes. The signifiers "exceed" both of them-each one
can "translate" the other. The dissymetry cancels itself.
These theoretical reflections find a striking illustration
in the problem which occupies us. Evoking the cultural
taxonomy of visible objects, Greimas (1968) considers
that the pertinent traits of the iconic signifier ("traits of
recognition" in Umberto Eco's terms) coincide with those
of the linguistic signified-that is, with the semes of the
sememe. This proposition seems to me of great importance. From a perspective of visual semiology I return to
the linguistic analysis which Greimas made (1966:43--50)
of the French word tete in one of its senses ("material
object"). Permit me to simplify a little, in order to abbreviate the exposition. Greimas proposed four semes for
this sememe: extremity (of a more immense object); discontinuous extremity (culturally felt to be distinct from the
rest of what one would voluntarily call "the body"); superlative extremity (superior and/or anterior); and spherical
extremity (or "swelling").
These are four pertinent traits of the linguistic signified.
But there are alscr-and at this point the two things become confused-four pertinent traits of the iconic
signifier. If in an ethnographic film we perceive an object
which is unknown to us (a hunting weapon, for example,
or a musical instrument), and if this object presents at its
anterior extremity a distinct part with a rounded form, we
would not hesitate to perceive it as being the "head," or
tete, of this utensil which was previously impossible to
identify. All that our gaze would comprehend would be
that one of the parts of the object consists of a known
object, a "head." The four semes would then correspond
to four physical (optical) characteristics of the visual
signifier, that is, the visible "spot" which on the screen
forms the photograph of this "head." In the same way, we
recognize a "house," which could be seen in an image or
next to a walkway in the countryside, thanks to certain
perceptual traits which are separable from the entirety.
The silhouette which we have before our eyes evokes an
object constructed by man. It contains several walls, has
a roof, a door, and so forth. These different features are
also the semes of the word "house" in one of its senses
(edifice).
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From Objects to Actions

The Return of the Signifier
It is thus confirmed that the articulation between the
taxonomies of vision and the visual part of the lexicon, in
the bosom of a single culture, establishes itself at two
levels simultaneously. The first is between the respective
signifieds (object and sememe ), insofar as one considers
this the ordinary intercodal relationship, simple "translation," the terminal list of surface correspondences. The
second is between the pertinent traits of the signifier (on
the side of the object-code) and those of the signified (on
the side of the metacode) when one envisages the cultural classification of objects as an active operation of the
metacodal type in which the main point plays itself
against units "smaller" than the whole object and
"smaller" than the whole sememe, at the outcome of concrete nomination. One conceives of this articulation as
the historical production of nomination, a production in
which language, the universal commentator, comes to
state the law and its partitions, even though in the final
analysis it would itself be, like the visible world , entirely
informed by social forces. In the following table, I represent the double relationship of language and vision. One
ascertains that the two sides of the object-code (signifier
and signified) articulate themselves toward the signified
of the metacode, and toward it only. The signifier of the
metacode, formed from phonetic sequences which designate the perceptual units, bears no direct relation to the
object-code. It can only "speak" globally, and from the
exterior, through the intermediary of its own signified , the
metacodal signified.

visual signifier

linguistic signifier

(forms, contours, etc.)
with its pertinent traits

phonic sequences

~

deep correspondences
between pertinent traits

~
visual signified
recognizable object

linguistic signified

:...~.....__---•• (sememe)
with its pertinent traits
(semes)

Until now I have spoken only of "objects." But visually
recognizable "actions" exist as well. The problem of
nomination thus moves from the noun toward the verb, at
least for Western societies and languages, where the
noun and the verb, the object and the action, are clearly
distinct. Except for that point, the principle of analysis
remains the same. Thus, in a film in which the images are
blurred and difficult to read, it is sufficient for our purposes that certain optical traits are clearly marked in
order to perceive that someone has thrown something . In
this example, it seems to me that the pertinent traits of the
perceptible action, and of the lexeme "to throw" in the
corresponding sense, are two in number (a minimal deduction but set in a potentially larger paradigm).
1 Material object which distances itself from the body of the
person (the opposite of "to catch ," "to reach," etc. , in
which the object approaches the person).
2 Muscular action on the part of the person (the opposite of
"to let fall," "to let escape," "to let loose," etc., where the
object distances itself but the person is passive).
Clearly the analysis should be pushed further, moving
closer and closer to the larger group of verbs of movement, and to the larger organization of the visual world (or
at least the principal gestural units). For example, the two
traits which I have noted as the most immediately striking
presuppose two others by an implied relationship: the
"material object," or at least an inert one, here the projectile, and its opposition to an "animate be ing," a person
or animal , or even another material object conceived and
perceived as "active" (a catapult can also throw something).

Noises . .. Sound Objects
The perspective which is proposed here is equally applicable to the world of recognizable noises and the corresponding sector of the lexicon. This aspect of the problem is particularly important in the case of sound film
(which in our age is all cinema), television , radio broadcasting, and so on. Even so, it has been studied much
less until now, because our culture grants a strong preference to the visual and does not pay attention to the
audio sphere, except when the subject is the sound of
language; of the two, the "noise" is often left behind .10
How is it explainable that in the soundtrack of a film set
in the countryside, or in the noisy confusion of a forest
where we are walking, we would be capable of recognizing and isolating a lapping sound (clapotis) , even if we
did not know its origin, and even if we identify as "lapping," from one occasion to another, noises which are
very different? One must admit that the "lapping" exists
as an autonomous sound object, with pertinent traits of its
acoustic signifier corresponding to those of the linguistic
signifier, from the semes to the sememe "lapping ." Four
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appear rather quickly, resulting from the "nearest" commutations:
1 The noise is relatively weak (as opposed to an uproar,
howl, din, crash, etc.).
2 It is discontinuous, which a distant hum, a whistling, or a
background noise is not.
3 It is acoustically "double," or, in any case, not simple, as
each of its emissions can be decomposed into two successive sounds/--!····!--····!--/. (In this respect, the
first two phonemes of the French linguistic signifier c-1apotis can be considered onomatopoeic). The commutation shows that the other identifiable noises do not have
this character and that each of their emissions is "simple,"
as in "detonation," or even "blow" or "shock" in their auditory sense. It is the opposition between floc and tac, or,
to give some English examples, "plop" and "plip."11
4 This noise is experienced as being liquid, or as being
provoked by a liquid; the opposite of "rubbing" or "scraping" in their auditory sememe, which presents the trait
"solid," or even "sizzling" and "hissing," with the trait
"gaseous."
These four traits, and all those of the same genre which
I have forgotten, are common to both auditory perception
and language. There would be no point whatever in asking whether they define the "lapping" (clapotis) as
characteristic sound or as the French word clapotis,
since the noise and the word exist only by virtue of each
other. Our four traits constitute a level of articulation
where the two things coincide, under the metacodal stat·
ute of language.

Ideological Reduction of the Sound Dimension
There is a difference, however, between the visual and
the auditory in our cultural definition. When I recognize a
"lamp" and can name it, the identification is terminated.
All that could be added would be on the order of adjectives or determiners. On the contrary, if I distinctly hear a
"lapping" or a "whistling," and if I can say that, I only have
the feeling of making a first identification, a marking as
yet incomplete. This impression disappears when I recognize that it is the lapping of a river or the whistling of
the wind in the trees. The recognition of a sound leads
directly to the question "What makes the noise?" There is
something of a paradox there, since the sememes of the
initial identification ("whistling," "sizzling," "rubbing," etc.)
correspond to actual sound profiles, while those of the
final identification (the wind, the river), which are not at all
auditory, articulate the source of the noise and not the
noise itself..
Within language as the metacode of noises, the most
perfect identification is obviously that which simultaneously designates the sound and its source ("rumbling
of thunder"). But if one of these two indicators must be
suppressed, it is curious to note that it can be the soundobject which suffers the least damage in overall recogni-
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tion. If I perceive a rumble, without further precision, there
exists some mystery and a sense of suspense (horror
films do not miss playing on this); the identification is
only roughly sketched. If I perceive "thunder" without paying the least attention to its acoustical characteristics, the
identification is sufficient.
One might perhaps reply that the example is tendentious because thunder is an object which is nothing other
than sound (one cannot see it; lightning is what one
sees). But the situation stays the same with objects which
do not exhibit themselves through their noise. If I allude to
the "throbbing of a machine," my conversational partner
may consider that he does not know exactly what I am
talking about and may ask, "What machine?" I have
nevertheless been precise in the clarification of the
noise, but remained vague on that of its source. It will
suffice that I reverse my axes of precision by saying,"lt's a
jet airplane noise," in order for everyone to then be of the
opinion that I have explained myself clearly, and to feel
satisfied. From the moment when the sound source is
recognized (jet airplane), the taxonomies of noise themselves (throbbing, whistling, etc.) can only be supplied,
at least for our age and in our latitudes, as supplementary
precisions, not felt to be indispensable, basically in the
nature of adjectives, even when they express themselves
linguistically as nouns. At the level of discourse, one is no
longer entirely within nomination, but already is moving a
little way into description.
Ideologically, the sound source is an object, the sound
itself a character. Like all characters, it is attached to the
object. Simply because the identification of the latter suffices to evoke the noise, the inverse is not necessarily
true. "To comprehend" a perceptual given is not to grasp
it exhaustively in all its aspects, but to be capable of
classifying it, of putting it in a pigeonhole, 12 to designate
the object of which it is one occurrence. Noises are also
classified much more according to the objects which
produce them than according to their own properties.
But this situation is not at all natural: from a logical
point of view, the "throbbing" is an object, an acoustical
object, on the same level that the tulip is an optical object. Language takes this into account elsewhere--or at
least the lexicon does, failing discourse-since a great
number of recognizable noises, reduced nevertheless to
the level of characters, still correspond to nouns. It is a
sort of compromise, which does not prevent auditory
traits from participating more feebly than others in the
dominant principle of recognition of objects. Furthermore, when one wishes to name the same concept as the
sound-object, it is necessary, as I have just done and as
the supporters of musique concrete often do, to add to
the word "object" the attributive adjective "sound," when
no precision at all is required for what should logically be
called "visual object." We consider it evident that a flag is
an object, but we hesitate about the ullulation of owls: this
is an infraobject, only a sound-object.
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"Sur un substantialisme sauvage"

The "Off-Screen Sound" in Cinema

Thus there is deeply implanted in our culture (and doubtless in others, although not necessarily all of them) a sort
of wild "substantial ism," which distinguishes fairly strictly
the first qualities that determine the list of objects (substances) and the second qualities that correspond to as
many of the attributes as are susceptible to being linked
to these objects. It is a conception reflected throughout
the entire tradition of Western philosophy, starting with
the notions of Descartes and Spinoza, which recaptures
the preceding phrase. It is equally clear that this "worldview" has something to do with subject-predicate structure, particularly strong in Indo-European languages.
One can think that for us the first qualities are on the
order of the visual and the tactile-tactile because touch
is traditionally the very criterion of materiality; 13 visual
because the guide marks necessary to daily life and to
techniques of production emphasize naming by eye more
than by any other sense (it is only in language that the
auditory order, as if to compensate, finds "rehabilitation").
The subject is too immense to be approached usefully
here. It is even now possible, however, to begin to encircle certain qualities which seem to be "second": thus ·for
noises, evoked a moment ago, or the olfactory qualities (a
perfume is hardly an object), or even such subdimensions on the visual order as color. 14
In a clothing store, if two articles are of an identicar cut
but distinguished by color, one considers that it is "the
same pullover (or the .same pair of pants) in two shades."
Culture feels the permanence of the object, language
affirms it; only the attributes vary. But if two articles are of
the same color and a different cut, no one would say or
think that the boutique offers "the same color in two garments" (incorrect formula, and not by accident, in which
the color will be in the position of grammatical subject).
Rather, one will announce that these "two garments," this
scarf and this skirt, for example, ".are of the same color."
The articulation restores the color to its place, that of the
predicate; these are two distinct objects which have one
attribute in common .

The division of first and second qualities plays a large
role in one of the classic problems of film theory, that of
"off-screen sound." In a film , a sound is considered offscreen (literally, outside the screen) when it is actually the
sound source which is off-screen. So, one defines the
"off-screen voice" as that of a person who does not appear visually on the screen. One forgets that the sound
itself is never "off"; either it is audible or it really does not
exist. When it exists, it cannot be situated inside the rectangle or outside it, since the property of sound is to
diffuse more or less throughout the total environmental
space. The sound is simultaneously "on" the screen, in
front of it, behind it, around it, and in the whole theater.15
On the contrary, when one says that a visual element of
a film is off-screen, it really is. One can reestablish it by
inference from what is visible within the limits of the rectangle, but one does not see it. A well-known examp le
would be that of "the bait"; one predicts the presence of a
person where one only perceives, on one side of the
screen, the hand or the-shoulder; all the rest is really out
of the field of view.
The matter is clear: the language of technic ians and
studios, without their realizing it, applies a conceptualization to sound which only makes sense for the image.
One pretends to speak of sound , but one in fact thinks of
the visual image of the sound source.
This confus ion finds itself obviously favored by a
characteristic of noise which is phys ical and not social.
The spatial anchorage of sound "givens" is much more
vague and blurred than that of visual "givens." The two
sensory orders do not have the same re lationship to
space. Sound is much more constrained , even when it
indicates a general direction (but rarely an entirely precise placement, as it is the contrary of the rule for the
visible). One understands that film techn ic ians have
based their class ification on the less elusive of the two
elements. (It must nevertheless be remembered that the
phylogenetic choice of an acoustical material , the sound
of a voice, for the signifiers of human language, probably
derives from the same reasons: phonic communicat ion is
not interrupted by obscurity, by the night; one can speak
to someone who is behind oneself, or is hidden by an
obstacle, or is in an unknown place, etc. The relative
weakness of the relation to space procures here multiple
advantages of which the human race would lose the benefits should it choose a visual language.)
But to come back to off-screen sound in film , the physical "givens" do not suffice to explain the persistent confusion between the sound-object itself and the visual
image of its source; from the most literal definition, the
concept of off-screen sound lies in this confusion. There
is something else behind it which is cultural and which
we have already encountered : namely, the concept of
sound as an attribute, as nonobject, and the tendency to
neglect its proper characteristics for the benefit of those
of the corresponding "substance," the vis ible object emitting the sound .
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Conclusion
In this study I have wanted to show that the perceptual
object is a constructed unit, socially constructed, and in
one sense a linguistic unit. Here we are already far from
the '; adverse spectacle" of the subject and the object, of
this there is, cosmological as much as existential (at any
rate transcendental) within which phenomenology
wished to establish our presence to objects, and the
presence of objects to us. I am not so sure that this "distancing" is so great only on certain axes and does not
carry along a complete rupture of the horizon. Obviously I
spoke of semes, of pertinent optical traits, and so on; that
is, of elements which have the property of not having one
single existence and which are, on the contrary-on the
contrary or prec isely?-the conditions for the possibility
of real life, the structures of production which shape it
and which lose themselves in it, which find in it the place
of their manifestation and their negation simultaneously:
the objective determinations of subjective sentiment. To
concentrate interest on this inconspicuous stratum is to
stray from the path of phenomenology. But the obvious
stratum-apart from the fact that it has its own reality,
authorizing possible studies or already having led to
benefit-is equally the only one which arranges from the
outset those studies which its movement will then distance itself from.
I have tried my best to comprehend why perception
proceeds through objects. But I felt from the first, and still
feel keenly, that it proceeds (and the phenomenologists
do not say anything different) in effect as follows: in order
that I try to analyze the "objects" which are so striking to
the native (and from the start, in order that I be able to feel
them) , it was necessary that I myself be the native and
that I be struck by the same things as he was. One knows
that every psychoanalytic enterprise begins through a
"phenomenology," following the term of the analysts
themselves. That is not true in this domain. Each time that
one wants to explain something, it is most advisable to
begin by experiencing it.

Translation Notes
* This essay was originally published as Le per9u et le nomme, in Pour
une esthetique sans entrave ; Melanges Mikel Dufrenne (Hommage
collectif) , Paris: Editions 10/18, 1975, pp. 345-377. It was then reprinted
in Metz's collected papers, Essais Semiotiques, Paris: Klincksieck,
1977, pp. 129-163. The present version modifies the original footnotes
to separate references cited from actual footnotes relating to the text.
t Diegesis (French , diegese) is a term coined by the French writer
Etienne Souriau to indicate the denotative material of film . The concept
is discussed in Metz 1968 (Eng . transl.1974:97-98).
:t: ·Micheline is an autorail with tires invented by the Michelin Tire Company and used for the Paris Metro.
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Notes
1 I'm thinking of course of the famous Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and also of
isolated attempts such as Sommerfelt's (1938) on the language and
culture of the Aranta tribe of Australia.
2 President day sociolinguistics, situated after generative tranformational linguistics, rightly tries to exceed the purely lexical stage. It also
would like to exceed the Chomskyan distinction between "competence " and "performance," which rejects as pure performance important social variations in the usage of a single national language. On the
intersection of these two perspectives and the idea of constructing
proper grammars (syntactic and/or phonological) as for example Black
English (English as spoken by Black Americans) or that of other
sociolinguistic groups, cf. the work of Labov and the variationist
school.
3 Is a sememe each "sense" of a lexeme (Greimas 1966: 43-45) or of a
paralexeme (1966:38)? The paralexeme of Greimas corresponds
closely to the syntheme of Martinet (1968) . Greimas does not propose
a special term to commonly designate the lexeme and the paralexeme;
Martinet calls this the "theme." I follow Martinet here, because his term
is particularly useful to me. The perceptual object can correspond
equally to either a lexeme or a paralexeme (syntheme) , but only on the
side of the signified and only in a single sense. Here, the Greimasian
term sememe is the only one available.
4 Greimas (1968) speaks of figures and "natural signs." The context
shows that what he means by "natural" is "perceptual." (It is a bit like
when linguists speak of "natural languages" as opposed to formalized
languages or metalanguages, without a thought that these languages
are also really natural.) In my text I prefer to avoid the word "natural."
5 The same idea is found in Schaff (1965). It is that language is an
"instrument" because it contributes to the decoupage of perceptual
units, but it is also (like perception itself) a product, a product of social
life.
6 In Eco (1970:16)--a French translation of part of Eco 1968--"We select
the fundamental aspects of the perceived following the codes of recognition: when we are at the zoo and we see a zebra far away, the
elements that we recognize immediately (and that our memory retains)
are the stripes and not the silhouette which vaguely resembles that of a
donkey or mule. (... ) But suppose there exists an African community
where the only known quadrupeds are the zebra and the hyena, and
where horses, mules, and donkeys are unknown. In order to recognize
the zebra it will not be necessary to perceive the stripes( ... ) and in
order to draw a zebra it will be more important to emphasize the form of
the snout and the length of the legs, in order to distinguish the quadruped represented from the hyena (who also has stripes; the stripes
thus do not constitute a factor of differentiation.)"
7 In Metz (1971 :207-209) I distinguished two exactly similar cases by
taking up and more precisely specifying the traditional comparison
between the cinematographic image and the ideogram. I noted that in
the former case it is the spectator himself who "makes" the schema; in
the latter it is already made, or at least, in certain of its forms, notably
the pictogram and morphogram.
8 It is direct when each formal unit of the signified corresponds to a
formal unit of the signifier; without either one or the other having followed proper internal articulations (codes of the "symbolic " type following Hjelmslev). It is indirect in the contrary case (" linguistic" codes
in the larger sense, formed by "signs" and not by symbols) when the
level of the signifier and the level of the signified each have their
"figures" (units smaller than the sign) which are not isomorphic; thus
the internal organization of the signified is not transferred from that of
the signifier. They are nevertheless dependent (from wh ich I derive my
expression "indirect correlate") because the form of the signifier and
that of the signified continue to coincide on the level of the sign , even if
this entails diverging later on the level of the figures. In this conception, the symbol is a sign without figures (or the sign a symbol without
figures). Proper languages are the best example of a system of the
linguistic type, with figures: there is no bi-univocal correspondence
between the phonemes or the phonic traits (figures of the signifier of a
sign) and the semes, figures of the signified of the same sign
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(Hjelmslev 1953). The Hjelmslevian distinction between symbolic systems and linguistic systems is better known by the name "symbolic
systems/semiotic systems" or "symbolic systems/languages" (which
fiqures elsewhere in my work) .
See Benveniste (1969:130-131). Language is the only semiotic system
that can be universally "interpreted ." The same idea figures in the total
work of Hjelmslev; see his paper "Structural Analysis of Language,"
appended in Hjelmslev 1953. Different codes other than languages are
"restrained languages"; languages are "non-restrained languages."
A widely held view insists that the privileged position of phonic languages leads in our culture to an underdevelopment of visual richness.
And this is not mistaken. But this is even more true of the sonic richness of "noises," which are very directly in competition with language
by virtue of the fact that they also have an auditory signifier.
Onomatopoeia, which takes exception to the "arbitrariness" of linguistic signification , represents the case where a direct link exists between
the signifier of the metacode (language) and the set of the object-code
(perceptual code) . On cases of this sort where there appears a "motiva'Lion " for the linguistic signifier, see the important work of Pierre
Guiraud (1961 , 1962, 1967).
In the field of semiology this idea has been developed in a particularly
clear and demonstrative fashion by Luis Prieto (1966, especially chapter 2, "Le mecanisme de I' ind ication," pp . 15-27). Every indication is an
indication of a class. A class only has meaning in relationship to a
complementary class (or classes) in the presupposed universe of discourse.
I have already led up to this remark by an entirely different route in my
"On the impression of reality in the cinema" in Metz 1968 (translated
1974).
It is not without reason that noncolor film , i.e. , black and white film, was
possible (culturally as a result of demand) for many years and that in
large measure it still is. Smell film does not correspond to any strong
and generalized expectation. Sound and talking film, ordinary film
today, is almost always more filled with speech than sound , so much
so that the noises found therein are poor and stereotyped. In fact, the
only cinematographic elements which interest everyone, and not only
a few specialists, are image and speech.
This is related to another characteristic fact of cinema today. The visual
givens are only reproduced there by condition of certain perceptual
distortions (the absence of binocular factors of relief, the presence of a
screened rectangle which marks, on the contrary, the absence of real
vision , and so forth). The auditory givens are reproduced on the conditions that the sound recording has been properly done, and does not
suffer a single phenomenal deficit in relation to the corresponding
noise in the real world . Nothing, in principle, distinguishes a gunshot
heard in a film from a gunshot heard in the streets. "Sounds do not
contain the image" as film theoretician Bela Balazs said. Even so, the
sounds of cinema diffuse within the space as do the sounds of life, or
very nearly so. This difference in perceptual status between that which
one calls "reproduction" when dealing with the visual , and that which
one qives the same name, when dealing with the audible, is discussed
in my "Problemes actuels de theorie du cinema," pp. 57-58 in Metz
1973; also see Metz 1971 :209-210.
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